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Falsifying the null hypothesis that “fish do not feel pain"
Response II to Commentary on Key on Fish Pain
Brian Key
School of Biomedical Sciences
The University of Queensland
Abstract: The reader of Animal Sentience may surmise that because the weight of the
commentaries on my target article, “Why fish do not feel pain,” is leaning towards not
supporting my argument, it follows that the premise "fish do not feel pain" is incorrect.
However, science does not prevail by popular opinion. History is plagued with numerous
(and often widely accepted) examples of biological phenomena being explained by
mysterious forces. In the absence of a mechanistic understanding, the many different
guises of vitalism (the principle that life involves a vital energy) are often invoked to
explain the unknown. Spurious assumptions tend to exist when there is ignorance and
misunderstanding of mechanisms. The most effective way to argue against contrived
explanations is to discover fundamental causal mechanisms. Likewise, the best way to
falsify the null hypothesis that "fish do not feel pain" is to investigate the underlying
neural mechanisms generating pain.
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As progress is made in understanding the neurobiology of pain, there will be no logical
reason to bestow pain on animals (or plants; Baluška) that lack the neural circuitry that
underpins the neural processing and computations necessary for pain. There will also be
no need to invoke subjective arguments relying either on benefits of doubt, or moralistic
judgements (Wadiwel), or rhetoric (Sneddon & Leach) to explain fish behaviour in
response to noxious stimuli. Dismissing the argument that structure determines
function by simplifying it to the level of saying that any animal without a cortex can’t feel
pain or rephrasing it to suggest that only the “complete human system for pain can
generate the experience of pain” (Elwood; Merker; Segner; Sneddon & Leach) does
not cancel the need to decipher the casual mechanisms of pain. Furthermore, it is not
good enough to suggest that because conscious awareness is still not completely
understood in humans (Stevens), we can’t begin to propose reasonable inferences with
regard to fish.
Confusing terminology
It is important in this argument not to confuse terminology. Stevens raises the issue of
terminology and how it can interfere with progress in the field. Segner states that “the
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response to pain involves a non-conscious, reflexive action and a conscious perception.”
The use of “the response to pain” is incorrect and should be replaced with “the response
to noxious stimuli can involve.” This is important because such confusion can support
the folk belief that pain is in the periphery. Sneddon & Leach talk of “painful stimuli.”
Once again, the stimuli they refer to are “noxious.” Pain refers to the conscious
awareness of the stimuli and should be distinguished from the stimulus. This distinction
was eloquently articulated at the turn of the 20th century by one of the founders of
contemporary neurophysiology, Charles Sherrington. Sneddon & Leach further conflate
nociception and pain (as well as stress and pain) and then surprisingly proceed to
discuss “empirical evidence for pain” as being “in touch with current thinking on brain
evolution.” This line of reasoning easily leads to anthropomorphic conclusions, such as
that fish engage in “deception.”
Alternative anatomies have been tried and found wanting
I have argued very explicitly that signal amplification and global integration underlie the
conscious processing associated with pain (Key 2015a, Key 2015b; Key 2016a, Key
2016b). The principal neural circuitry responsible for these phenomena was then
identified in humans, rodents and probably birds, and subsequently demonstrated to be
lacking in fish. Others have adopted similar approaches and reached the same
conclusions (Rose). It is not helpful to simply reject the existing neuroscience and
instead resort to mysterious processes occurring somewhere else in the brain
(Gagliano; Godfrey-Smith; Gonçalves-de-Freitas; Sneddon & Leach) without a
genuine attempt to propose how these regions are mechanistically responsible.
Although Panksepp and Merker have suggested that the brainstem and other
subcortical regions support emotions, they use reflexive motor behaviours
inappropriately as measures of hypothetical feelings. There is no doubt that these
regions participate in motor output, but the feeling is associated with specialised neural
circuitry as reported (Key 2016a). Merker elevates the midbrain tectum to a
fundamental role in fish pain even though tectal ablation does not perturb responses to
noxious stimuli, and this region lacks the necessary neural architecture (Key 2016a).
There is no evidence that the tectum in primates contributes directly to conscious
awareness (Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010), but it is certainly involved in bottom-up
attentional mechanisms (Clark et al., 2015).
Shriver argues that the lesion data on the role of the insula in human pain is not entirely
clear; he then proposes that this undermines my interpretation. My discussion of this
matter in the target article is unfortunately overlooked by Shriver, who mistakenly
suggests that I did not discuss the work of Starr et al. (2009). As I explicitly articulated,
the argument is not about a single brain region; rather, it encompasses the broader
neural architecture and circuitry that allow signal amplification and global integration.
Burghardt suggests that pain could arise in the cerebellum because it is
disproportionately large in some species. This size hypothesis lacks any credibility and
any level of explanatory power particularly when one realizes that the granule cell
population in the human cerebellum is about four times the total number of all neurons
in the cerebral cortex (Anderson et al., 1992). Segner suggests that the structurefunction approach is somehow flawed because recent evidence that human “babies, at
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least from week 35-37 onward, are able to perceive pain” conflicts with prior literature
indicating that immature human nervous systems may not be capable of feeling pain. I
won’t go into the details of this literature here, but Segner seems to misunderstand that
science is always probing and refining hypotheses. Nonetheless, these early human
infant studies appear very promising, and one hopes they will lead to a better
understanding of the neurophysiology and neural circuits underlying pain.
To argue that because vision is possible in animals with brains different from those of
humans, it follows that animals with different brains must be able to feel pain (Elwood)
is unfortunately to misunderstand the problem. It is important not to confuse the
generic term vision with the qualia or phenomenal conscious experience of vision (what
it feels like to see “red”). Confusing these terms quickly leads to the idea that facial
recognition software can experience visual information. My argument clearly dismisses
such a possibility.
Searching for conscious behaviours has been unrewarding
Trawling through the literature for possible examples of behaviour that could be
wishfully perceived as evidence of either fish pain (Gagliano; Sneddon & Leach) or
crab pain (Godfrey-Smith) or felt emotions (Merker; Panksepp) — or resorting to
just-so stories to the effect that fish display any behaviour that “mammalian cortical pain
regions make possible” (Shriver) — does not contribute to understanding mechanisms.
Likewise, hoping for the development of a fish scale for somatic responses to noxious
stimuli (van Rysewyk) is not helpful.
Shriver suggests that conditioned place preference is “one of the best measures of pain
behaviour in nonhuman animal models” but then correctly acknowledges that there is
no a priori reason why this requires conscious experience. Consequently, he then
suggests that trace conditioning may be a better measure since it appears to require
conscious awareness. The idea that trace conditioning requires conscious awareness has
been hotly debated since Clark and Squire (1998) correlated conscious awareness of the
contingency between conditioned and unconditioned stimuli with successful trace
conditioning. More recently, it has become apparent that trace conditioning can be
performed without the need for either conscious awareness of the unconditioned
stimulus or contingent awareness between stimuli (Eichenbaum, 1999; Perruchet et al.,
2015; Price, 2015). Consequently, trace conditioning cannot be considered a good
measure of conscious awareness in fish as proposed by Shriver.
Gene expression is not behaviour
It needs to be pointed out that evidence of an animal expressing a gene in one species is
not evidence that it is indicative of a particular behaviour in any other species. Gene
expression needs to be placed in the broader context of the micro-environment in which
it is expressed (i.e., other genes, cells, tissues and organs). Sneddon & Leach suggest
that the expression of opioid receptors is evidence for fish feeling pain. This logic is like
assuming that any species expressing ion channels must be capable of metacognition.
The complex neurobiology associated with morphine function in the nervous system
needs to be appreciated. Unfortunately, Sneddon & Leach’s misunderstandings of a
number of basic concepts in their commentary results in erroneous reasoning.
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Pain by another name
One cannot dismiss the notion that fish do not feel pain by attempting to explain away
the problem with an alternate definition of fish pain. Disguising the problem with terms
such as “undifferentiated consciousness” (Burghardt) or “raw experience” does not
dismiss the need to understand casual mechanisms. Derbyshire points out clearly that
the idea of “raw experience” is not a proxy for pain. However, if such terms are
introduced, then they too demand mechanistic explanations.
Falsification of the null hypothesis
There is no need to resort to hypothetical explanations about the evolutionary benefits
of pain to fish survival — or to just-so stories about complex fish behaviours — in the
attempt to falsify the null hypothesis that “fish do not feel pain.” Deciphering the neural
mechanisms responsible for pain will reveal decisively whether fish are capable of
feeling noxious stimuli as pain. The experimental approaches are now well established,
and evidence to date indicates that the null hypothesis has not been rejected.
References
Anderson, B.B., Korbo, L. and Pakkenberg, B. (1992) A quantitative study of the human
cerebellum with unbiased stereological techniques. J. Comp. Neurol. 326:549-560.
Baluška, F. (2016) Should fish feel pain? A plant perspective. Animal Sentience 2016.023
Burghardt, G.M. (2016) Critical anthropomorphism. Animal Sentience 2016.024
Clark, K., Squire, R.F., Merrikhi, Y. and Noudoost, B. (2015) Visual attention: linking
prefrontal sources to neuronal and behavioural correlates. Progr. Neurobiol. 132:5980.
Clark, R.E. and Squire, L.R. (1998) Classical conditioning and brain systems: The role of
awareness. Science 280:77-81.
Derbyshire, S.W.G. (2016) Fish lack the brains and the psychology for pain. Animal
Sentience 2016.025
Eichenbaum, H. (1999) Conscious awareness, memory and the hippocampus. Nature
Neurosci. 2:775-776.
Elwood, R.W. (2016) A single strand of argument with unfounded conclusion. Animal
Sentience 2016.026
Gagliano, M. (2016) What would the Babel Fish say? Animal Sentience 2016.027
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2016) Pain in parallel. Animal Sentience 2016.028

4

Animal Sentience 2016.039: Response II to Commentary on Key on Fish Pain

Gonçalves-de-Freitas, E. (2016) Fish and pain welfare. Animal Sentience 2016.029
Jensen, K., Kirsch, I., Odmalm, S., Kaptchuk, T.J. and Ingvar, M. (2015) Classical
conditioning of analgesic and hyperalgesic pain responses without conscious
awareness. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 112:7863-7867.
Key, B. (2015a) Fish do not feel pain and its implications for understanding phenomenal
consciousness. Biol. Phil. 30:149-165.
Key, B. (2015b) Why fish (likely) don’t feel pain. Scientia Salon Feb 5th
https://scientiasalon.wordpress.com
Key, B. (2016a) Why fish do not feel pain. Animal Sentience 2016.003
Key, B. (2016b) Going beyond just-so stories. Animal Sentience 2016.022
Lovejoy, L.P. and Krauzlis, R.J. (2010) Inactivation of primate superior colliculus impairs
covert selection of signals for perceptual judgements. Nature Neurosci. 13:261-267.
Merker, B. (2016) Drawing the line on pain. Animal Sentience 2016.030
Panksepp, J. (2016) Brain processes for “good” and “bad” feelings: How far back in
evolution? Animal Sentience 2016.031
Perruchet, P., Grégoire, L., Aerts, K. and Poulin-Charronnat, B. (2015) Dissociating
conscious expectancies from automatic-link formation in an electrodermal
conditioning paradigm. Psycholog. Res. In press.
Price, D.D. (2015) Unconscious and conscious mediation of analgesia and hyperalgesia.
PNAS 112:7624-7625.
Rose, J.D. (2016) Pain in fish: Weighing the evidence. Animal Sentience 2016.032
Segner, H. (2016) Why babies do not feel pain, or: How structure-derived functional
intepretations can go wrong. Animal Sentience 2016.033
Shriver, A. (2016) Cortex necessary for pain – not in the sense that it matters. Animal
Sentience 2016.034
Sneddon, L.U. and Leach, M.C. (2016) Anthropomorphic denial of fish pain. Animal
Sentience 2016.035
Starr, C.J., Sawaki, L., Wittenberg, G.F., Burdette, J.H., Oshiro, Y., Quevedo, A.S. and Coghill,
R.C. (2009) Roles of the insular cortex in the modulation of pain: insights from brain
lesions. J. Neurosci. 29:2684-2694.
Stevens, E. D. (2016) Why is fish “feeling” pain controversial? Animal Sentience
2016.036

5

Animal Sentience 2016.039: Response II to Commentary on Key on Fish Pain

Van Rysewyk, S. (2016) Nonverbal indicators of pain. Animal Sentience 2016.037
Wadiwel, D. (2016) Fish and pain: The politics of doubt. Animal Sentience 2016.038

6

